Search results for: Putin

Authors: Matthew J. Flynn

Abstract:

In early 2022, a thirty-mile column of Russian armor and assault vehicles sat poised to move south on the road to Kiev. That force has withdrawn as the Russians concentrate on attacking eastern Ukraine. Vladimir Putin’s armies appear content to destroy cities in an effort to attrit the Ukrainian will to continue fighting. That pivot signifies the acceptance of the ascendancy of the defense that now dictates any battlefield world-wide. To defeat what military theorist Carl von Clausewitz labeled “the stronger form of war” with a successful offensive requires an exercise in future war. In the past, the ascendancy of the defense has been overcome by a number of things including the application of superior leadership, better technology, organizational adaptation, and surpassing environmental limitations. A look at how each of these factors came to impact battle can tell us a great deal about what Ukraine means to tomorrow’s fight, and where the focus should lie to win the next war. Civilians presently secure the defensive ascendancy impacting warfare by dominating the shifts from domain to domain thanks to controlling access to cyberspace. That mandate will be tested and eventually falter. This paper tests the desirability of that proposition, as well as hoping for something more from humanity other than repeated and frequent wars making future war look much like past wars. As nations struggle to control cyberspace, a referendum on war as part of the human condition comes into focus.

Keywords: cyber, domains, future war, Putin, Ukraine

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Authors: Karin Megheșan, Alexandra Popescu, Teodora Dobre

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In the past few years, the Russian Federation has become a central point on the security agenda of the most important international actors, due to its reloaded aggressiveness of foreign policy. Vladimir Putin, the actual president of the Russian Federation, has proven that Russia can and has the willingness to become the powerful actor that used to be during the Cold War. Russia’s new behavior on the international scene showed that Russia has not only expansionist (where expansionist is not only in terms of territory but also of ideology) intentions, but also the necessary resources, to build an empire that may have the power to counterbalance the influence of the United States and stop the expansion of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization in an equation understood of multipolar Russian view. But in order to do this, there is necessary to follow a well-established plan or policy. Thus, the aim of the paper is to discuss how has the foreign policy of the Russian Federation evolved under the influence of the military and security strategies of the Russian nation, to briefly examine some of the factors that sculpture Russian foreign policy and behavior, in order to reshape a Russian (Soviet) profile so far considered antiquated. Our approach is an argument in favor of the analyses of the recent evolutions embedded in the course of history. In this context, the paper will include analytical thoughts about the Russian foreign policy and the latest strategic documents (security strategy and military doctrine) adopted by the Putin administration, with the purpose to highlight the main direction of action followed by all these documents together. The paper concludes that the military component is to be found in all these strategic documents, as well as at the core of Russian national interest, aspect that proves that Russia is still the adept of the traditional realist paradigm, reshaped in a Russian theory of the multipolar world.

Keywords: hybrid warfare, military component, military doctrine, Russian foreign policy, security strategy

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Authors: Elcin Timur Cakmak, Ayse Oguzlar

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This study presents the results of the tweets sent by Twitter users on social media about the Russia-Ukraine war by bigram and trigram methods. On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared a military operation against Ukraine, and all eyes were turned to this war. Many people living in Russia and Ukraine reacted to this war and protested and also expressed their deep concern about this war as they felt the safety of their families and their futures were at stake. Most people, especially those living in Russia and Ukraine, express their views on the war in different ways. The most popular way to do this is through social media. Many people prefer to convey their feelings using Twitter, one of the most frequently used social media tools. Since the beginning of the war, it is seen that there have been thousands of tweets about the war from many countries of the world on Twitter. These tweets accumulated in data sources are extracted using various codes for analysis through Twitter API and analysed by Python programming language. The aim of the study is to find the word sequences in these tweets by the n-gram method, which is known for its widespread use in computational linguistics and natural language processing. The tweet language used in the study is English. The data set consists of the data obtained from Twitter between February 24, 2022, and April 24, 2022. The tweets obtained from Twitter using the #ukraine, #russia, #war, #putin, #zelensky hashtags together were captured as raw data, and the remaining tweets were included in the analysis stage after they were cleaned through the preprocessing stage. In the data analysis part, the sentiments are found to present what people send as a message about the war on Twitter. Regarding this, negative messages make up the majority of all the tweets as a ratio of %63,6. Furthermore, the most frequently used bigram and trigram word groups are found. Regarding the results, the most frequently used word groups are “he, is”, “I, do”, “I, am” for bigrams. Also, the most frequently used word groups are “I, do, not”, “I, am, not”, “I, can, not” for trigrams. In the machine learning phase, the accuracy of classifications is measured by Classification and Regression Trees (CART) and Naïve Bayes (NB) algorithms. The algorithms are used separately for bigrams and trigrams. We gained the highest accuracy and F-measure values by the NB algorithm and the highest precision and recall values by the CART algorithm for bigrams. On the other hand, the highest values for accuracy, precision, and F-measure values are achieved by the CART algorithm, and the highest value for the recall is gained by NB for trigrams.

Keywords: classification algorithms, machine learning, sentiment analysis, Twitter

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Authors: Zhengyang Ma, Zhiyao Li, Jiayi Zhang

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This article examines the prospect theory’s arguments about decision-making through two case studies, the First Gulf War and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The article uses the methods of comparative case analysis and process tracing to investigate the prospect theory’s fundamental arguments. Through evidence derived from existing primary and secondary sources, this paper argues that both former U.S. President Bush and Russian President Putin viewed their situations as a domain of loss and made risky decisions to prevent further deterioration, which attests the arguments of the prospect theory. After the two case studies, this article also discusses how the prospect theory could be used in analyzing the decision-making process that led to the current Russia-Ukraine War.

Keywords: the prospect theory, international relations, the first gulf war, the crimea crisis

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Authors: Maryam Azish

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Russia, as an emerging global player in recent years, has projected a special place in the Middle East. Despite all the challenges it has faced over the years, it has always considered its presence in various fields with a strategy that has defined its maneuvering power as a level of competition and even confrontation with the United States. Therefore, its current approach is considered important as an influential actor in the Middle East. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the Russians withdrew completely from the Middle East, the American scene remained almost unrivaled by the Americans. With the start of the US-led war in Iraq and Afghanistan and the subsequent developments that led to the US military and political defeat, a new chapter in regional security was created in which ISIL and Taliban terrorism went along with the Arab Spring to destabilize the Middle East. Because of this, the Americans took every opportunity to strengthen their military presence. Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan have always been the three areas where terrorism was shaped, and the countries of the region have each reacted to this evil phenomenon accordingly. The West dealt with this phenomenon on a case-by-case basis in the general circumstances that created the fluid situation in the Arab countries and the region. Russian President Vladimir Putin accused the US of falling asleep in the face of ISIS and terrorism in Syria. In fact, this was an opportunity for the Russians to revive their presence in Syria. This article suggests that utilizing the recognition policy along with the constructivism theory will offer a better knowledge of Russia’s endeavors to endorse its international position. Accordingly, Russia’s distinctiveness and its ambitions for a situation of great power have played a vital role in shaping national interests and, subsequently, in foreign policy, in Putin's era in particular. The focal claim of the paper is that scrutinize Russia’s foreign policy with realistic methods cannot be attained. Consequently, with an aim to fill the prevailing vacuum, this study exploits the politics of acknowledgment in the context of constructivism to examine Russia’s foreign policy in the Middle East. The results of this paper show that the key aim of Russian foreign policy discourse, accompanied by increasing power and wealth, is to recognize and reinstate the position of great power in the universal system. The Syrian crisis has created an opportunity for Russia to unite its position in the developing global and regional order after ages of dynamic and prevalent existence in the Middle East as well as contradicting US unilateralism. In the meantime, the writer thinks that the question of identifying Russia’s position in the global system by the West has played a foremost role in serving its national interests.

Keywords: constructivism, foreign Policy, middle East, Russia, regionalism

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Authors: Soran Tarkhani

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A glance at social media shows that Russia's invasion of Ukraine receives considerable support among Arabs. This significant support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine is puzzling since most Arab leaders openly condemned the Russian invasion through the UN ES‑11/4 Resolution, and Arabs are among the first who experienced the devastating consequences of war firsthand. This article tries to answer this question by using multiple regression to analyze the online content of Arab responses to Russia's invasion of Ukraine on seven major news networks: CNN Arabic, BBC Arabic, Sky News Arabic, France24 Arabic, DW, Aljazeera, and Al-Arabiya. The article argues that the underlying reason for this Arab support is a reaction to the common anti-Western sentiments among Arabs. The empirical result from regression analysis supports the central arguments and uncovers the motivations behind the endorsement of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the opposing Ukraine by many Arabs.

Keywords: Ukraine, Russia, Arabs, Ukrainians, Russians, Putin, invasion, Europe, war

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Authors: Elina Vroblevska, Toms Ratfelders

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This paper examines the impact of international status-seeking aspirations on great power behavior within the international system. In particular, we seek to test the assumption advanced by the proponents of the Social Identity Theory (SIT) that the inability to achieve social mobilization through joining perceived higher-status social groups (of states) leads great powers to adopt the approach of social competition in which they aim to equal or outdo the dominant group in the area on which its claim to superior status rests. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has struggled to be accepted as a great power by the group of Western states that had created the dominant international system order, while the Soviet states were isolated. While the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century can be characterized by striving to integrate into the existing order, the second decade has seen a rather sharp turn towards creating a new power center for Russia through the realization of ideas of multipolarity rivalry and uniqueness of the state itself. Increasingly, we have seen the Kremlin striving to collaborate and mobilize groups of states that fall outside of the categories of democracy, multiculturalism, and international order, the way that is perceived by the dominant group, which can be described as the West. Instead, Russia builds its own narrative where it creates an alternative understanding of these values, differentiating from the higher-status social group. The Global South, from a Russian perspective, is the group of states that can still be swayed to create an alternative power center in the international system - one where Russia can assert its status as a great power. This is based on a number of reasons, the most important being that the global north is already highly institutionalized in terms of economy (the EU) and defense (NATO), leaving no room for Russia but to integrate within the existing framework. Second, the difference in values and their interpretation - Russia has been adamant, for the last twenty years, on basing its moral code on traditional values like religion, the heterosexual family model, and moral superiority, which contradict the overall secularism of the Global North. And last, the striking difference in understanding of state governance models - with Russia becoming more autocratic over the course of the last 20 years, it has deliberately created distance between itself and democratic states, entering a “gray area” of alternative understanding of democracy which is more relatable to the global South countries. Using computational text analysis of the excerpts of Vladimir Putin’s speeches delivered from 2000-2022 regarding the areas that fall outside the immediate area of interest of Russia (the Global South), we identify 80 topics that relate to the particular component of the great power status - interest to use force globally. These topics are compared across four temporal frames that capture the periods of more and less permissible Western social boundaries. We find that there exists a negative association between such permissiveness and Putin’s emphasis on the “use of force” topics. This lends further support to the Social Identity Theory and contributes to broadening its applicability to explaining the questions related to great power assertiveness in areas outside of their primary focus regions.

Keywords: Russia, Global South, great power, identity

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Authors: Daria Lozovskaia

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This paper is focused on the news coverage of public opinion polls about Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in Russian state-controlled media. After the announcement of the start of the so-called “Special Military Operation” on February 24, 2022, the number of publications of the results of public opinion polls increased many times over, and the poll numbers began to be discussed on social media and in the Kremlin’s official informational agenda. Headlines like "72 Percent of Russian Citizens Support the Operation " or "Russians Believe in Victory in the Special Military Operation" have become prominent parts of Russian state propaganda news stories and newspapers. At the same time, public opinion in Russia, as a concept and model, differs from the generally accepted democratic concept and has its own specifics. As a result, public opinion polls and their results, especially after February 24, have a number of features in the form of the dominance of the discourse of political elites in the media, which leads to a decrease in public awareness, the prevalence of the effect of joining the majority and a high number of non-responses due to fear of reprisals. The aim of this study was to determine the role of public opinion polls in the system of Russian war propaganda in Ukraine. For this purpose, were selected publications of the Russian media, the agenda of which corresponds to the official information policy of the Russian authorities. First, using frame analysis for the categories "Explicit trust", "Implicit trust", "Implicit distrust" and "Explicit distrust", provided by Irina Dusakova, the broadcast level of trust in the data of public opinion polls was determined. The results of this phase of the study showed that the Russian media broadcast an absolute level of confidence in public opinion polls regarding support for the war in Ukraine. The second stage of the study was the content analysis of publications. The categories of this analysis were derived from Anna Morelli's 10 Principles of Military Propaganda and Haavard Koppang's Definition of Propaganda to determine the purposes of the use of public opinion polls by Russian propaganda. The results of the study not only confirmed the widespread hypothesis that public opinion polls in Russia are used as a tool of state propaganda, but also showed that their purpose is to demonstrate the consolidation of society in support of the war and President Vladimir Putin.

Keywords: propaganda, public opinion, public opinion polls, Russian studies

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Authors: Mandy Tao Benec

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Propaganda, understood as a ‘deliberate attempt to persuade people to think and behave in a desired way’, contributes to the fabric of mass media discourse as an important component, albeit often under various alternative expressions except ‘propaganda’. When the word ‘propaganda’ does appear in the mainstream media of the West, it is often selectively applied upon undesiring parties such as China, the North Korea, Russia’s Putin, or terrorists, etc.. This attitude reveals an ‘us verse them’ mentality; and a presupposition that propaganda is something only ‘they’ do whilst ‘we’ do not. This phenomenon not only runs in danger of generating political naivety, but also calls for the necessity of re-examining propaganda which will benefit from analysing it in contrasting social and political environments. Therefore, this paper aims to compare how propaganda has been understood and put in practice both in the Anglo-American context and by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). By revealing the convergence and divergence of the propaganda discourses between China and the West, it will help clarify the misconception and misunderstanding of the term. Historical narrative analysis and critical discourse analysis are the main methodologies. By carefully examining data from academic research on propaganda in both English and Chinese, the landscape of how propaganda is defined throughout different eras is mapped, with special attention paid to analysing the parallelism and/or correspondence between China and the West when applicable. Meanwhile, critically analysing the official documents such as speeches and guidelines for propaganda administration given by top-rank CCP leaders will help reveal that in contrast to the West’s ‘us-them’ mentality, China sees oneself in no difference with the Western democracies when propaganda is concerned. Major findings of this study will identify a series of convergence and divergence between Chinese and Western propaganda discourses, and the relationship between propaganda the ‘signified’ (its essence) and propaganda the ‘signifier’ (the term itself), including (yet not limited to): 1) convergence in China catching up with the West, acknowledging the perceived pejorative connotation of the term 2) divergence in propaganda activities disassociated from the term in the West; and convergence in adopting such practice when China following suit in its external propaganda towards the West 3) convergence in utilising alternative notions to replace ‘propaganda’, first by the West, then imported and incorporated enthusiastically by China into its propaganda discourse 4) divergence between China’s internal and external propaganda and the subsequent differentiation between in which contexts the CCP sees fit to utilise the concept 5) convergence between China and the West in their English language propaganda discourses, whilst simultaneous divergence in their presuppositions: ‘usthem’ by the West and ‘we are the same’ by China. To conclude, this paper will contribute to the study of propaganda and its discourse by analysing how propaganda is understood and utilised in both worlds, and hence to uncover the discourse power struggle between the two, which contributes to the propaganda discourse itself. Hence, to untie the misconception of propaganda.

Keywords: China, discourse, power, propaganda

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