Search results for: P. Sturzenegger

Authors: G. Blugan, B. Jiang, J. Thornberry, P. Sturzenegger, U. Gonzenbach, M. Misson, D. Cartlidge, R. Stenerud, J. Kuebler

Abstract:

Low-cost ceramic spheres were developed and manufactured from the engineering ceramic aluminium oxide. Hollow spheres of 50 mm diameter with a wall thickness of 0.5-1.0 mm were produced via an adapted slip casting technique. It was possible to produce the spheres with good repeatability and with no defects or failures in the spheres due to the manufacturing process. The spheres were developed specifically for use in buoyancy devices for deep-sea exploration conditions at depths of 3000 m below sea level. The spheres with a 1.0 mm wall thickness exhibit a buoyancy of over 54% while the spheres with a 0.5 mm wall thickness exhibit a buoyancy of over 73%. The mechanical performance of the spheres was confirmed by performing a hydraulic burst pressure test on individual spheres. With a safety factor of 3, all spheres with 1.0 mm wall thickness survived a hydraulic pressure of greater than 150 MPa which is equivalent to a depth of more than 5000 m below sea level. The spheres were then incorporated into a buoyancy module. These hollow aluminium oxide ceramic spheres offer an excellent possibility of deep-sea exploration to depths greater than the currently used technology.

Keywords: buoyancy, ceramic spheres, deep-sea, oil exploration

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Authors: Jie Liu, Wei Wei, Chun-Ping Chang

Abstract:

Using a sample of 110 countries over the period 1984-2013, this paper examines the impacts of country risks on choosing a specific exchange rate regime (first by utilizing the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger de facto classification and then robusting it by the IMF de jure measurement) relative to other regimes via the panel multinomial logit approach. Empirical findings are as follows. First, in the full samples case we provide evidence that government is more likely to implement a flexible regime, but less likely to adopt a fixed regime, under a low level of composite and financial risk. Second, we find that Eurozone countries are more likely to choose a fixed exchange rate regime with a decrease in the level of country risk and favor a flexible regime in response to a shock from an increase of risk, which is opposite to non-Eurozone countries. Third, we note that high-risk countries are more likely to choose a fixed regime with a low level of composite and political risk in the government, but do not adjust the exchange rate regime as a shock absorber when facing economic and financial risks. It is interesting to see that those countries with relatively low risk display almost opposite results versus high-risk economies. Overall, we believe that it is critically important to account for political economy variables in a government’s exchange rate policy decisions, especially for country risks. All results are robust to the panel ordered probit model.

Keywords: country risk, political economy, exchange rate regimes, shock absorber

Procedia PDF Downloads 271