Search results for: A. Lefebre

Authors: W. Lakhdari, B. Doumendji-Mitich, A. Dahliz, S. Doumendji, Y. Bouchikh, R. M'lik, H. Hammi, A. Soud

Abstract:

This work was done in order to fight against Brachytrupes megacephalus, a major pest in the Algerian oasis and promote one aspect of biological control against it. He wears a hand on the isolation and identification of indigenous fungi on imagos of this insect harvested in the station of INRAA Touggourt and secondly, the study of the pathogenicity of these strains fungal on this orthoptère adults. The results obtained showed the presence of six different species of entomopathogenic fungi, it is: Aspergillus flavus, Fusarium sp, Beauveria bassiana, Penicillium sp, Metharizium anisopliae and Aspergillus Niger. The pathogenicity test using fungi Beauveria bassiana strains and Metharizium anisopliae. On adult of B. megacephalus highlights the effectiveness of these strains of predatory adults, with a mortality rate approaching 100% after 11 days.

Keywords: biological control, brachytrupes megacephalus, entomopathogenic fungi, Southeastern Algeria

Procedia PDF Downloads 409

Authors: Alissa Lefebre

Abstract:

It might seem intuitive to hope for a fast decision on the patent grant. After all, a granted patent provides you with a monopoly position, which allows you to obstruct others from using your technology. However, this does not take into account the strategic advantages one can obtain from keeping their patent applications pending. First, you have the financial advantage of postponing certain fees, although many applicants would probably agree that this is not the main benefit. As the scope of the patent protection is only decided upon at the grant, the pendency period introduces uncertainty amongst rivals. This uncertainty entails not knowing whether the patent will actually get granted and what the scope of protection will be. Consequently, rivals can only depend upon limited and uncertain information when deciding what technology is worth pursuing. One way to keep patent applications pending, is the use of divisional applications. These applicants can be filed out of a parent application as long as that parent application is still pending. This allows the applicant to pursue (part of) the content of the parent application in another application, as the divisional application cannot exceed the scope of the parent application. In a fast-moving and complex market such as the tele- and digital communications, it might allow applicants to obtain an actual monopoly position as competitors are discouraged to pursue a certain technology. Nevertheless, this practice also has downsides to it. First of all, it has an impact on the workload of the examiners at the patent office. As the number of patent filings have been increasing over the last decades, using strategies that increase this number even more, is not desirable from the patent examiners point of view. Secondly, a pending patent does not provide you with the protection of a granted patent, thus not only create uncertainty for the rivals, but also for the applicant. Consequently, the European patent office (EPO) has come up with a “raising the bar initiative” in which they have decided to tackle the strategic use of divisional applications. Over the past years, two rules have been implemented. The first rule in 2010 introduced a time limit, upon which divisional applications could only be filed within a 24-month limit after the first communication with the patent office. However, after carrying-out a user feedback survey, the EPO abolished the rule again in 2014 and replaced it by a fee mechanism. The fee mechanism is still in place today, which might be an indication of a better result compared to the first rule change. This study tests the impact of these rules on the strategic use of divisional applications in the tele- and digital communication industry and provides empirical evidence on their success. Upon using three different survival models, we find overall evidence that divisional applications prolong the pendency time and that only the second rule is able to tackle the strategic patenting and thus decrease the pendency time.

Keywords: divisional applications, regulatory changes, strategic patenting, EPO

Procedia PDF Downloads 126

Authors: A. Lefebre, M. Willekens, K. Debackere

Abstract:

Since the 1990s, patent applications have been booming, especially in the field of telecommunications. However, this increase in patent filings has been associated with an (alleged) decrease in patent quality. The plethora of low-quality patents devalues the high-quality ones, thus weakening the incentives for inventors to patent inventions. Despite the rich literature on strategic patenting, previous research has neglected to emphasize the importance of patent portfolio management and its impact on patent quality. In this paper, we compare related patent portfolios vs. nonrelated patents and investigate whether the patent quality and innovativeness differ between the two types. In the analyses, patent quality is proxied by five individual proxies (number of inventors, claims, renewal years, designated states, and grant lag), and these proxies are then aggregated into a quality index. Innovativeness is proxied by two measures: the originality and radicalness index. Results suggest that related patent portfolios have, on average, a lower patent quality compared to nonrelated patents, thus suggesting that firms use them for strategic purposes rather than for the extended protection they could offer. Even upon testing the individual proxies as a dependent variable, we find evidence that related patent portfolios are of lower quality compared to nonrelated patents, although not all results show significant coefficients. Furthermore, these proxies provide evidence of the importance of adding fixed effects to the model. Since prior research has found that these proxies are inherently flawed and never fully capture the concept of patent quality, we have chosen to run the analyses with individual proxies as supplementary analyses; however, we stick with the comprehensive index as our main model. This ensures that the results are not dependent upon one certain proxy but allows for multiple views of the concept. The presence of divisional applications might be linked to the level of innovativeness of the underlying invention. It could be the case that the parent application is so important that firms are going through the administrative burden of filing for divisional applications to ensure the protection of the invention and the preemption of competition. However, it could also be the case that the preempting is a result of divisional applications being used strategically as a backup plan and prolonging strategy, thus negatively impacting the innovation in the portfolio. Upon testing the level of novelty and innovation in the related patent portfolios by means of the originality and radicalness index, we find evidence for a significant negative association with related patent portfolios. The minimum innovation that has been brought on by the patents in the related patent portfolio is lower compared to the minimum innovation that can be found in nonrelated portfolios, providing evidence for the second argument.

Keywords: patent portfolio management, patent quality, related patent portfolios, strategic patenting

Procedia PDF Downloads 93