Commenced in January 2007
Frequency: Monthly
Edition: International
Paper Count: 13

Agency Theory Related Abstracts

13 Linking Business Owners’ Choice of Organizational Form to Appraisers’ Determination of Value: An Agency Theory Perspective

Authors: Ali Muhammad, Majdi Anwar Quttainah, William Paczkowski

Abstract:

Determining the value of a privately held firms confound those in academia as well as practitioners in the fields of appraisal, forensic accounting, and law. Divergent parties to the transfer look to apply the valuation technique to serve their own best interests. This paper seeks to explore how agency theory induces owners to choose the form of their businesses at inception and how this choice will affect the appraisers’ valuation of the firm at the transfer of ownership.

Keywords: Value, Agency Theory, organizational form

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12 The Impact of Corporate Governance on Risk Taking in European Insurance Industry

Authors: Francesco Venuti, Simona Alfiero

Abstract:

The aim of this paper is to develop an empirical research on the nature and consequences of corporate governance on Eurozone Insurance Industry risk taking attitude. More particularly, we analyzed the effect of public ownership on risk taking with respect to privately held Insurance Companies. We also analyzed the effects on risk taking attitude of different degrees of ownership concentration, directors compensation, and the dimension/diversity of the Board of Directors. Our results provide quite strong evidence that, coherently with the Agency Theory, publicly traded insurance companies with more concentrated ownership are less risky than the corresponding privately held.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Agency Theory, Risk Taking, insurance companies

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11 Bank Internal Controls and Credit Risk in Europe: A Quantitative Measurement Approach

Authors: Ellis Kofi Akwaa-Sekyi, Jordi Moreno Gené

Abstract:

Managerial actions which negatively profile banks and impair corporate reputation are addressed through effective internal control systems. Disregard for acceptable standards and procedures for granting credit have affected bank loan portfolios and could be cited for the crises in some European countries. The study intends to determine the effectiveness of internal control systems, investigate whether perceived agency problems exist on the part of board members and to establish the relationship between internal controls and credit risk among listed banks in the European Union. Drawing theoretical support from the behavioural compliance and agency theories, about seventeen internal control variables (drawn from the revised COSO framework), bank-specific, country, stock market and macro-economic variables will be involved in the study. A purely quantitative approach will be employed to model internal control variables covering the control environment, risk management, control activities, information and communication and monitoring. Panel data from 2005-2014 on listed banks from 28 European Union countries will be used for the study. Hypotheses will be tested and the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression will be run to establish the relationship between dependent and independent variables. The Hausman test will be used to select whether random or fixed effect model will be used. It is expected that listed banks will have sound internal control systems but their effectiveness cannot be confirmed. A perceived agency problem on the part of the board of directors is expected to be confirmed. The study expects significant effect of internal controls on credit risk. The study will uncover another perspective of internal controls as not only an operational risk issue but credit risk too. Banks will be cautious that observing effective internal control systems is an ethical and socially responsible act since the collapse (crisis) of financial institutions as a result of excessive default is a major contagion. This study deviates from the usual primary data approach to measuring internal control variables and rather models internal control variables in a quantitative approach for the panel data. Thus a grey area in approaching the revised COSO framework for internal controls is opened for further research. Most bank failures and crises could be averted if effective internal control systems are religiously adhered to.

Keywords: Agency Theory, credit risk, internal controls, revised COSO framework

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10 Corporate Social Responsibility and Dividend Policy

Authors: Mohammed Benlemlih

Abstract:

Using a sample of 22,839 US firm-year observations over the 1991-2012 period, we find that high CSR firms pay more dividends than low CSR firms. The analysis of individual components of CSR provides strong support for this main finding: five of the six individual dimensions are also associated with high dividend payout. When analyzing the stability of dividend payout, our results show that socially irresponsible firms adjust dividends more rapidly than socially responsible firms do: dividend payout is more stable in high CSR firms. Additional results suggest that firms involved in two controversial activities -the military and alcohol - are associated with low dividend payouts. These findings are robust to alternative assumptions and model specifications, alternative measures of dividend, additional control, and several approaches to address endogeneity. Overall, our results are consistent with the expectation that high CSR firms may use dividend policy to manage the agency problems related to overinvestment in CSR.

Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, Agency Theory, signaling theory, dividend policy, Lintner model, dividend stability

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9 The Differences and the Similarities between Corporate Governance Principles in Islamic Banks and Conventional Banks

Authors: Osama Shibani

Abstract:

Corporate governance effective is critical to the proper functioning of the banking sector and the economy as a whole, the Basel Committee have issued principles of corporate governance inspired from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), but there is no single model of corporate governance that can work well in every country; each country, or even each organization should develop its own model that can cater for its specific needs and objectives, the corporate governance in Islamic Institutions is unique and offers a particular structure and guided by a control body which is Shariah supervisory Board (SSB), for this reason Islamic Financial Services Board in Malaysia (IFSB) has amended BCBS corporate governance principles commensurate with Islamic financial Institutions to suit the nature of the work of Islamic institutions, this paper highlight these amended by using comparative analysis method in context of the differences of corporate governance structure of Islamic banks and conventional banks. We find few different between principles (Principle 1: The Board's overall responsibilities, Principles 3: Board’s own structure and practices, Principles 9: Compliance, Principle 10: Internal audit, Principle 12: Disclosure and transparency) and there are similarities between principles (Principle 2: Board qualifications and composition, Principles 4: Senior Management (composition and tasks), Principle 6: Risk Management and Principle 8: Risk communication). Finally, we found that corporate governance principles issued by Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) are complemented to CG principles of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) with some modifications to suit the composition of Islamic banks, there are deficiencies in the interest of the Basel Committee to Islamic banks.

Keywords: Agency Theory, basel committee (BCBS), corporate governance principles, Islamic financial services board (IFSB)

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8 Dividend Policy in Family Controlling Firms from a Governance Perspective: Empirical Evidence in Thailand

Authors: Tanapond S.

Abstract:

Typically, most of the controlling firms are relate to family firms which are widespread and important for economic growth particularly in Asian Pacific region. The unique characteristics of the controlling families tend to play an important role in determining the corporate policies such as dividend policy. Given the complexity of the family business phenomenon, the empirical evidence has been unclear on how the families behind business groups influence dividend policy in Asian markets with the prevalent existence of cross-shareholdings and pyramidal structure. Dividend policy as one of an important determinant of firm value could also be implemented in order to examine the effect of the controlling families behind business groups on strategic decisions-making in terms of a governance perspective and agency problems. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of ownership structure and concentration which are influential internal corporate governance mechanisms in family firms on dividend decision-making. Using panel data and constructing a unique dataset of family ownership and control through hand-collecting information from the nonfinancial companies listed in Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) between 2000 and 2015, the study finds that family firms with large stakes distribute higher dividends than family firms with small stakes. Family ownership can mitigate the agency problems and the expropriation of minority investors in family firms. To provide insight into the distinguish between ownership rights and control rights, this study examines specific firm characteristics including the degrees of concentration of controlling shareholders by classifying family ownership in different categories. The results show that controlling families with large deviation between voting rights and cash flow rights have more power and affect lower dividend payment. These situations become worse when second blockholders are families. To the best knowledge of the researcher, this study is the first to examine the association between family firms’ characteristics and dividend policy from the corporate governance perspectives in Thailand with weak investor protection environment and high ownership concentration. This research also underscores the importance of family control especially in a context in which family business groups and pyramidal structure are prevalent. As a result, academics and policy makers can develop markets and corporate policies to eliminate agency problem.

Keywords: Agency Theory, Thailand, dividend policy, family control

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7 Non-Family Members as Successors of Choice in South African Family Businesses

Authors: Jonathan Marks, Lauren Katz

Abstract:

Family firms are a vital component of a country’s stability, prosperity and development. Their sustainability, longevity and continuity are critical. Given the premise that family firms wish to continue the business for the benefit of the family, the family founder / owner is faced with an emotionally charged transition option; either to transfer the family business to a family member or to transfer the firm to a non-family member. The rationale employed by family founders to select non-family members as successors/ executives of choice and the concomitant rationale employed by non-family members to select family firms as employers of choice, has been under-researched in the literature of family business succession planning. This qualitative study used semi-structured interviews to gain access to family firm founders/ owners, non-family successors/ executives and industry experts on family business. The findings indicated that the rationale for family members to select non-family successors/ executives was underpinned by the objective to grow the family firm for the benefit of the family. If non-family members were the most suitable candidates to ensure this outcome, family members were comfortable to employ non-family members. Non- family members, despite the knowledge that benefit lay primarily with family members, chose to work for family firms for personal benefits in terms of wealth, security and close connections. A commonly shared value system was a pre-requisite for all respondents. The research study provides insights from family founders/ owners, non-family successors/ executives, and industry experts on the subject of succession planning outside the family structure.

Keywords: Family Business, Agency Theory, institutional logics, non-family successors, Stewardship Theory

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6 The Misuse of Free Cash and Earnings Management: An Analysis of the Extent to Which Board Tenure Mitigates Earnings Management

Authors: Michael McCann

Abstract:

Managerial theories propose that, in joint stock companies, executives may be tempted to waste excess free cash on unprofitable projects to keep control of resources. In order to conceal their projects' poor performance, they may seek to engage in earnings management. On the one hand, managers may manipulate earnings upwards in order to post ‘good’ performances and safeguard their position. On the other, since managers pursuit of unrewarding investments are likely to lead to low long-term profitability, managers will use negative accruals to reduce current year’s earnings, smoothing earnings over time in order to conceal the negative effects. Agency models argue that boards of directors are delegated by shareholders to ensure that companies are governed properly. Part of that responsibility is ensuring the reliability of financial information. Analyses of the impact of board characteristics, particularly board independence on the misuse of free cash flow and earnings management finds conflicting evidence. However, existing characterizations of board independence do not account for such directors gaining firm-specific knowledge over time, influencing their monitoring ability. Further, there is little analysis of the influence of the relative experience of independent directors and executives on decisions surrounding the use of free cash. This paper contributes to this literature regarding the heterogeneous characteristics of boards by investigating the influence of independent director tenure on earnings management and the relative tenures of independent directors and Chief Executives. A balanced panel dataset comprising 51 companies across 11 annual periods from 2005 to 2015 is used for the analysis. In each annual period, firms were classified as conducting earnings management if they had discretionary accruals in the bottom quartile (downwards) and top quartile (upwards) of the distributed values for the sample. Logistical regressions were conducted to determine the marginal impact of independent board tenure and a number of control variables on the probability of conducting earnings management. The findings indicate that both absolute and relative measures of board independence and experience do not have a significant impact on the likelihood of earnings management. It is the level of free cash flow which is the major influence on the probability of earnings management. Higher free cash flow increases the probability of earnings management significantly. The research also investigates whether board monitoring of earnings management is contingent on the level of free cash flow. However, the results suggest that board monitoring is not amplified when free cash flow is higher. This suggests that the extent of earnings management in companies is determined by a range of company, industry and situation-specific factors.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Earnings Management, Agency Theory, boards of directors

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5 The Influence of Remuneration Committees, Directors' Shareholding and Institutional Ownership on the Remuneration of Directors in the Large Listed Companies in South Africa

Authors: Henriette Scholtz

Abstract:

Excessive executive directors’ remuneration remains a major concern for many stakeholders and are some of the factors to blame for the recent global financial crisis. The objective of this study was to examine whether certain firm characteristics are an effective way of protecting shareholders’ interests with respect to executive directors’ remuneration. To achieve this, an ordinary least squares model was used to test the relationship between the remuneration of executive directors and a number of firm and corporate governance characteristics to determine whether these characteristics have an influence on executive directors’ remuneration of large listed companies in South Africa. It was found that corporate governance reforms relating to institutional ownership, shareholder voting on the remuneration policy and the number of remuneration committee meetings acts as an effective governance tool to protect shareholder’s interests with regard to executive remuneration. There is no evidence that the number of non-executive directors on the remuneration committee has an influence on the executive directors’ remuneration.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Agency Theory, institutional ownership, executive directors’ remuneration, remuneration committee, directors’ shareholding

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4 The Impact of Board of Directors on CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK

Authors: Saleh Alagla, Murya Habbash

Abstract:

The paper investigates whether the board of directors plays a monitoring role or not in CEO compensation for the UK firms during the eve of the recent financial crisis, 2004-2008. The use of heteroscedastic and autocorrelated error consistent estimation of the panel data shows, surprisingly, that four board characteristics variables are found to play a significant role in increasing the level of CEO compensation. This insightful result would suggest evidence of the managerial power theory in general and the cronyism hypothesis in particular. Moreover, the interesting evidence supporting managerial power perspective is that CEO-Chair duality reduces long-term compensation while increasing short-term compensation, thus suggesting that CEOs are risk averse who prefer short-term compensation to long-term compensation. Finally, consistent with the agency perspective board size is found to increase all compensation variables as expected.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Agency Theory, board of directors, CEO compensation, internal governance mechanisms, managerial power theory, cronyism hypothesis

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3 Rethinking Riba in an Agency Theoretic Framework: Islamic Banking and Finance beyond Sophistry

Authors: Muhammad Arsalan

Abstract:

The efficiency of a financial intermediation system is assessed by its ability to achieve allocative efficiency, asset transformation, and the subsequent economic development. Islamic Banking and Finance (IBF) was conceived to serve as an alternate financial intermediation system adherent to the injunctions of Islam. A critical appraisal of the state of contemporary IBF reveals that it neither fulfills the aspirations of Islamic rhetoric nor is efficient in terms of asset transformation and economic development. This paper is an intuitive pursuit to explore the economic rationale of established principles of IBF, and the reasons of the persistent divergence of IBF being accused of ruses and sophistry. Disentangling the varying viewpoints, the underdevelopment of IBF has been attributed to misinterpretation of Riba, which has been explicated through a narrow fiqhi and legally deterministic approach. It presents a critical account of how incorrect conceptualization of the key injunction on Riba, steered flawed institutionalization of an Islamic Financial intermediation system. It also emphasizes on the wrong interpretation of the ontological and epistemological sources of Islamic Law (primarily Riba), that explains the perennial economic underdevelopment of the Muslim world. Deeming ‘a collaborative and dynamic Ijtihad’ as the elixir, this paper insists on the exigency of redefining Riba, i.e., a definition that incorporates the modern modes of economic cooperation and the contemporary financial intermediation ecosystem. Finally, Riba has been articulated in an agency theoretic framework to eschew expropriation of wealth, and assure protection of property rights, aimed at realizing the twin goals of a) Shari’ah adherence in true spirit, b) financial and economic development of the Muslim world.

Keywords: Economic Development, Islamic Banking and Finance, Financial Intermediation, Agency Theory, riba, information asymmetry, ijtihad

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2 Moderating Effects of Family Ownership on the Relationship between Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Financial Performance of Publicly Listed Companies in Nigeria

Authors: Ndagi Salihu

Abstract:

Corporate governance mechanisms are the control measures for ensuring that all the interests groups are equally represented and management are working towards wealth creation in the interest of all. Therefore, there are many empirical studies during the last three decades on corporate governance and firm performance. However, little is known about the effects of family ownership on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, especially in the developing economy like Nigeria. This limit our understanding of the unique governance dynamics of family ownership with regards firm performance. This study examined the impact of family ownership on the relationship between governance mechanisms and financial performance of publicly listed companies in Nigeria. The study adopted quantitative research methodology using correlational ex-post factor design and secondary data from annual reports and accounts of a sample of 23 listed companies for a period of 5 years (2014-2018). The explanatory variables are the board size, board composition, board financial expertise, and board audit committee attributes. Financial performance is proxy by Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). Multiple panel regression technique of data analysis was employed in the analysis, and the study found that family ownership has a significant positive effect on the relationships between corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance of publicly listed firms in Nigeria. This finding is the same for both the ROA and ROE. However, the findings indicate that board size, board financial expertise, and board audit committee attributes have a significant positive impact on the ROA and ROE of the sample firms after the moderation. Moreover, board composition has significant positive effect on financial performance of the sample listed firms in terms of ROA and ROE. The study concludes that the use of family ownership in the control of firms in Nigeria could improve performance by reducing the opportunistic actions managers as well as agency problems. The study recommends that publicly listed companies in Nigeria should allow significant family ownership of equities and participation in management.

Keywords: Profitability, Stakeholders, Agency Theory, board characteristics

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1 Analyzing Corporate Governance Disclosures in Type II Agency Problems in Indonesia

Authors: Martin S. Mulyadi

Abstract:

This research investigates the corporate governance disclosure behavior of Indonesian corporations with type II agency problems. The primary cause of the 1990s Asian financial crisis has been attributed to poor corporate governance practices in Indonesia. Most importantly, these poor practices were commonly found in family-owned and government-owned corporations. There are a lot of publicly listed family-owned and government-owned corporations in Indonesia. Agency theory refers to these corporations as corporations with type II agency problems. This research employs agency theory to analyzes corporate governance practice and disclosures in such settings and found that government-owned corporations perform better than family-owned corporations.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Agency Theory, corporate disclosures, type II agency problems

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