Preference Heterogeneity as a Positive Rather Than Negative Factor towards Acceptable Monitoring Schemes: Co-Management of Artisanal Fishing Communities in Vietnam

Authors: Chi Nguyen Thi Quynh, Steven Schilizzi, Atakelty Hailu, Sayed Iftekhar

Abstract:

Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs) have been emerged as a promising tool for fisheries conservation and management. However, illegal fishing has undermined the effectiveness of TURFs, profoundly degrading global fish stocks and marine ecosystems. Conservation and management of fisheries, therefore, largely depends on effectiveness of enforcing fishing regulations, which needs co-enforcement by fishers. However, fishers tend to resist monitoring participation, as their views towards monitoring scheme design has not been received adequate attention. Fishers’ acceptability of a monitoring scheme is likely to be achieved if there is a mechanism allowing fishers to engage in the early planning and design stages. This study carried out a choice experiment with 396 fishers in Vietnam to elicit fishers’ preferences for monitoring scheme and to estimate the relative importance that fishers place on the key design elements. Preference heterogeneity was investigated using a Scale-Adjusted Latent Class Model that accounts for both preference and scale variance. Welfare changes associated with the proposed monitoring schemes were also examined. It is found that there are five distinct preference classes, suggesting that there is no one-size-fits-all scheme well-suited to all fishers. Although fishers prefer to be compensated more for their participation, compensation is not a driving element affecting fishers’ choice. Most fishers place higher value on other elements, such as institutional arrangements and monitoring capacity. Fishers’ preferences are driven by their socio-demographic and psychological characteristics. Understanding of how changes in design elements’ levels affect the participation of fishers could provide policy makers with insights useful for monitoring scheme designs tailored to the needs of different fisher classes.

Keywords: Design of monitoring scheme, Enforcement, Heterogeneity, Illegal Fishing, Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries