Quasi-Federal Structure of India: Fault-Lines Exposed in COVID-19 Pandemic

Authors: Shatakshi Garg

Abstract:

As the world continues to grapple with the COVID-19 pandemic, India, one of the most populous democratic federal developing nation, continues to report the highest active cases and deaths, as well as struggle to let its health infrastructure not succumb to the exponentially growing requirements of hospital beds, ventilators, oxygen to save thousands of lives daily at risk. In this context, the paper outlines the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic since it first hit India in January 2020 – the policy decisions taken by the Union and the State governments from the larger perspective of its federal structure. The Constitution of India adopted in 1950 enshrined the federal relations between the Union and the State governments by way of the constitutional division of revenue-raising and expenditure responsibilities. By way of the 72nd and 73rd Amendments in the Constitution, powers and functions were devolved further to the third tier, namely the local governments, with the intention of further strengthening the federal structure of the country. However, with time, several constitutional amendments have shifted the scales in favour of the union government. The paper briefly traces some of these major amendments as well as some policy decisions which made the federal relations asymmetrical. As a result, data on key fiscal parameters helps establish how the union government gained upper hand at the expense of weak state governments, reducing the local governments to mere constitutional bodies without adequate funds and fiscal autonomy to carry out the assigned functions. This quasi-federal structure of India with the union government amassing the majority of power in terms of ‘funds, functions and functionaries’ exposed the perils of weakening sub-national governments post COVID-19 pandemic. With a complex quasi-federal structure and a heterogeneous population of over 1.3 billion, the announcement of a sudden nationwide lockdown by the union government was followed by a plight of migrants struggling to reach homes safely in the absence of adequate arrangements for travel and safety-net made by the union government. With limited autonomy enjoyed by the states, they were mostly dictated by the union government on most aspects of handling the pandemic, including protocols for lockdown, re-opening post lockdown, and vaccination drive. The paper suggests that certain policy decisions like demonetization, the introduction of GST, etc., taken by the incumbent government since 2014 when they first came to power, have further weakened the states and local governments, which have amounted to catastrophic losses, both economic and human. The role of the executive, legislature and judiciary are explored to establish how all these three arms of the government have worked simultaneously to further weaken and expose the fault-lines of the federal structure of India, which has lent the nation incapacitated to handle this pandemic. The paper then suggests the urgency of re-looking at the federal structure of the country and undertaking measures that strengthen the sub-national governments and restore the federal spirit as was enshrined in the constitution to avoid mammoth human and economic losses from a pandemic of this sort.

Keywords: COVID-19 pandemic, India, federal structure, economic losses