%0 Journal Article
	%A Daniela Elena Marinescu and  Ioana Manafi and  Dumitru Marin
	%D 2012
	%J International Journal of Economics and Management Engineering
	%B World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology
	%I Open Science Index 65, 2012
	%T An Adverse Model for Price Discrimination in the Case of Monopoly
	%U https://publications.waset.org/pdf/9180
	%V 65
	%X We consider a Principal-Agent model with the
Principal being a seller who does not know perfectly how much the
buyer (the Agent) is willing to pay for the good. The buyer-s
preferences are hence his private information. The model corresponds
to the nonlinear pricing problem of Maskin and Riley. We assume
there are three types of Agents. The model is solved using
“informational rents" as variables. In the last section we present the
main characteristics of the optimal contracts in asymmetric
information and some possible extensions of the model.
	%P 754 - 759