@article{(Open Science Index):https://publications.waset.org/pdf/6397,
	  title     = {Multi-Stakeholder Road Pricing Game: Solution Concepts},
	  author    = {Anthony E. Ohazulike and  Georg Still and  Walter Kern and  Eric C. van Berkum},
	  country	= {},
	  institution	= {},
	  abstract     = {A road pricing game is a game where various stakeholders and/or regions with different (and usually conflicting) objectives compete for toll setting in a given transportation network to satisfy their individual objectives. We investigate some classical game theoretical solution concepts for the road pricing game. We establish results for the road pricing game so that stakeholders and/or regions playing such a game will beforehand know what is obtainable. This will save time and argument, and above all, get rid of the feelings of unfairness among the competing actors and road users. Among the classical solution concepts we investigate is Nash equilibrium. In particular, we show that no pure Nash equilibrium exists among the actors, and further illustrate that even “mixed Nash equilibrium" may not be achievable in the road pricing game. The paper also demonstrates the type of coalitions that are not only reachable, but also stable and profitable for the actors involved.
},
	    journal   = {International Journal of Mathematical and Computational Sciences},
	  volume    = {6},
	  number    = {3},
	  year      = {2012},
	  pages     = {339 - 350},
	  ee        = {https://publications.waset.org/pdf/6397},
	  url   	= {https://publications.waset.org/vol/63},
	  bibsource = {https://publications.waset.org/},
	  issn  	= {eISSN: 1307-6892},
	  publisher = {World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology},
	  index 	= {Open Science Index 63, 2012},
	}