The Investors- Reaction to Investment Rating Change Announcements

Authors: Chih-Hsiang Chang, Liang-Chien Lee, Shu-Ling Wu

Abstract:

This study investigates the investors- behavioral reaction to the investment rating change announcements from the views of behavioral finance. The empirical results indicate that self-interest does affect the intention of securities firms to release investment ratings for individual stocks. In addition, behavioral pitfalls are also found in the response of retail investors to investment rating change announcements.

Keywords: Investment ratings, Behavioral finance, Self-interest, Behavioral pitfalls

Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1083275

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