%0 Journal Article
	%A Michael Lissack
	%D 2012
	%J International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences
	%B World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology
	%I Open Science Index 66, 2012
	%T When Explanations “Cause“ Error: A Look at Representations and Compressions
	%U https://publications.waset.org/pdf/10681
	%V 66
	%X We depend upon explanation in order to “make sense"
out of our world. And, making sense is all the more important when
dealing with change. But, what happens if our explanations are
wrong? This question is examined with respect to two types of
explanatory model. Models based on labels and categories we shall
refer to as “representations." More complex models involving
stories, multiple algorithms, rules of thumb, questions, ambiguity we
shall refer to as “compressions." Both compressions and
representations are reductions. But representations are far more
reductive than compressions. Representations can be treated as a set
of defined meanings – coherence with regard to a representation is
the degree of fidelity between the item in question and the definition
of the representation, of the label. By contrast, compressions contain
enough degrees of freedom and ambiguity to allow us to make
internal predictions so that we may determine our potential actions in
the possibility space. Compressions are explanatory via mechanism.
Representations are explanatory via category. Managers are often
confusing their evocation of a representation (category inclusion) as
the creation of a context of compression (description of mechanism).
When this type of explanatory error occurs, more errors follow. In
the drive for efficiency such substitutions are all too often proclaimed
– at the manager-s peril..
	%P 1243 - 1247