

Performance, Need and Discriminatory Allegiance of Employees as Awarding Criteria of Distributive Justice

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Abstract—Three types of salary distribution are usually proposed by the theorists of distributive justice: Equality, equity and need. Their influence has been studied, taking into consideration (in terms of equity) the performance of the employees and their degree of allegiance/rebellion in what regards discriminatory hierarchical orders, by taking into account the reasons of such allegiance/rebellion (allegiance out of conviction, legalism or opportunism/ethical rebellion). Conducted in Argentina, the study has confronted 480 students (240 male and 240 female) with a practical case in which they had to advise a manager of a real estate agency on the allocation of a bonus amongst his employees. The latter were characterized according to their respective performance, one of them being further defined as being (or not) in a financial need and as having complied (or not) with a discriminatory hierarchical order regarding foreigners. The results show that the distribution of the bonus only follows the rules of equity and need: The employees more efficient, allegiant or in need, are rewarded more than the others. It is also noteworthy that the allegiant employees are rewarded in the same way, regardless of the reason for their allegiance, and that the employee who refuses to adopt a discriminatory conduct is penalized.

Keywords—Distributive justice, equity, performance, allegiance, ethic.

I. INTRODUCTION

THE researchers and practitioners in the field of human resources have long been interested in organizational justice [1], [2]. The sense of justice/injustice influences indeed numerous professional conducts [3]-[5]. It plays on job satisfaction [6], [7], the intention to quit [8]-[10], on organizational commitment [6], [11], on work performance [12]-[16], on organizational citizenship behaviours [17], on the resistance to change [18], etc.

Organizational justice is usually conceived as consisting of three elements [19], [20]: Distributive justice, which refers to resource distribution [4], [21], [22], procedural justice, which deals with decision making in what regards promotions and remunerations [23]-[25], and interactional justice [26], [27], the latter being generally considered as consisting of two axes: an interpersonal axis (which deals with respect and courtesy

towards employees [28]) and an informational axis (which relates to the justification of practices and decisions [29], [30]). However, certain works [31] conclude with the existence of four factors, considering the interpersonal axis and the informational axis to be two full sized dimensions and not two axes of interactional justice.

The concept of distributive justice (DJ) is employed in order to designate two types of situations: those when we are in an exchange interaction with another and when we compare the benefits and investments of each (like a situation of negotiation between a buyer and a seller) and those when an individual receives a benefit from a third person (for example two employees receiving wages from an employer). The second case contains two types of analysis [32]. The first one is from the point of view of the receiver of the resources distributed in order to examine their perception of justice and the behavioural consequences (especially in terms of performance) of such perception [33]-[36]. The second type is interested in the person deciding the allocation and their choice of a distributive rule [4], [37], [39], [22]. In fact, the theorists of distributive justice [22], [37]-[40] distinguish three manners of distribution: equality, also called parity (each individual is paid the same, regardless of their contribution), and two unequal manners, with equity on the one hand (which sanctions merit, and especially each individual's contribution: in an equitable situation, the remunerations are proportional to the respective contributions), and needs on the other hand (each individual is remunerated according to their needs).

The criterion of merit is based on the works of Adams [41], [42] who, supplementing the research on the social theory of exchange [43]-[46], examines not justice but injustice, by analysing antecedents and consequences, aiming to develop a theory on inequity. According to this theory, the individual will establish a ratio of their payments for their contributions, and compare this ratio to that of others. The rewards for merit are primarily associated with situations in which the organization promotes performance and productivity [31], and it is found that the use of the equity rule leads to high efficiency [47]-[49]. The rewards based on merit can thus be considered incentives to produce more and better [50]. They promote inter-individual competition [39] at the expense of team spirit and group harmony. *A contrario*, the equality rule is associated with the preservation of harmony [51]-[52]-[22], thus reinforcing group identification [50]. It involves highly interdependent relations between individuals, while equity is observed rather in low interdependence situations [51].

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Moreover, it appears [53] that the most popular classes are most attached to equality. As for the rule of need, it applies mostly when one wishes to favour the wellbeing of everyone [54], which is observed especially in tight situations, such as family organizations.

It was also found that the rule depends especially on culture [48], [55]-[62]. Dubet [53] also states that Europeans (except for the Czechs), privilege needs, then merit, and rank equality last. In order to better understand the cultural elements leading to these differences, certain researchers [58] have used the Hofstede model [63], [64] of cultural individualism-collectivism, of hierarchical distance (which corresponds to the greater or lesser acceptance of social inequalities), of control of uncertainty, of masculinity and femininity (which refers to the greater or lesser permeability of roles between males and females) and of Confucian dynamism. It is then revealed that collectivist cultures favour equality and needs, while individualistic cultures are more focused on equity [65]-[72]. More specifically, it was found that North-Americans use equity preferentially [48], [57], [69], unlike the Chinese and the Koreans who choose equality more [68], [57], and the Indonesians who choose needs [71]. However, in a recent meta-analysis [73], it is observed that the examination of the impact of cultural differences is still very limited and focuses essentially on the perceptions and reactions of employees, but very little on the behaviours of managers. We also have to point out that cultural preference for a particular allocation rule can however be conditional. It is also observed [57] that the Americans prefer equity regardless of the nature of the social situation, while Chinese use equity in a conditional way: they employ it when dealing with persons outside of their social group, but for allocations within their social group, they prefer equality. Another research [49] shows that the rule of need is especially desired when the actors are culturally and emotionally close. In other words, it seems that the rule choice may depend on various factors, such as the nature of the social situation, the scarcity of resources to be allocated [74] or the nature of these resources [49].

If the rule of need can be based on a limited number of indications, on the contrary, the use of equity is likely to refer to numerous criteria. The contributions taken into consideration by Adams are actually very diverse: the effort produced in order to achieve a result and the result obtained (Miller [75] also speaks of *Merit* in the first case and *Deserts* for the result), education, seniority, age (which is also often correlated with seniority), gender, intelligence, ability, social status, ethnical origin, but also appearance, attractiveness, health, possession of certain tools, the characteristics of the spouse, the responsibilities undertaken, the risks undertaken (especially the risk of dismissal), etc. However, in spite of this abundance, it seems that certain contributing indicators have been insufficiently examined, either because they have been classified as rewards (Gangloff [76] also indicates that the working conditions could classify as risks undertaken and be examined as such in terms of contribution), or because they have only recently made the object of a satisfactory conceptualisation. Such is the case of compliance with the

allegiance norm, that is to say, in particular of compliance with orders given by a hierarchical superior. Several studies have indeed demonstrated a professional valuation of employers' allegiant behaviours [77], meaning, of a professional valuation of explanations and behaviours which, preserving the social environment, especially the hierarchical one, from any questioning, ensures its sustainability. The studies in this area also show that the allegiant employees have better odds of professional success than their non-allegiant homologues [78]-[80], and that during the selections, the recruiters preferentially choose the former over the latter [79]-[81], as part of a major recruitment campaign for workers in the automobile industry reviewing 1018 candidates). Other studies have even shown that the valuation of allegiant individuals may be doubled by the pathologization of non-allegiants, the latter being considered as suffering from mental illnesses [82], [83]. Furthermore, if we differentiate within allegiance and if we examine (by experimentally manipulating them) the reasons why those individuals behave in an allegiant or non-allegiant manner, we notice that the individuals who adopt allegiant behaviours out of respect for legality (*i.e.* those who consider that they should obey their hierarchical superiors because of the latter's higher status) are preferred to allegiants who act out of opportunism, that is to say, out of personal interest [84]. We should also note that the results obtained in France have been complemented by studies conducted in other countries, such as Switzerland [85] or Argentina. For example, in Argentina it has been observed that managers prefer to work with allegiant subordinates than with rebel subordinates [86], and that the subordinates are aware of this preference [87]. However, it has been observed that in Europe or on another continent, the valuation of allegiance has never been considered directly in relation to the research conducted on organizational justice. One could certainly consider that the recruiters' preference for allegiant individuals refers to distributive justice, but such a reinterpretation of the results, conducted, by definition, *posteriori*, and therefore disconnected from the goals of the study leading to the results in question, would in our view, be conceptually unsatisfactory. So, we wanted to hereby formally integrate allegiance with distributive justice, considering the variable as a contribution likely to give rise to a reward, as well as for example performance. This has led us precisely to desiring to examine the respective influence of the three variables in a situation of salary distribution among various employees: the performance of the employee (and more exactly, their performance within the position held [88]), their state of need, and their allegiance / non-allegiance to their hierarchical superior, taking into account the reasons for such allegiance/non-allegiance. More precisely, in what regards the latter aspect, considering the work of Monin, Sawyer and Marquez [89], which featured a moral rebel, it seemed interesting to hereby integrate that type of non-allegiance, and to rival it with three forms of allegiance (legalist, partisan and opportunistic allegiance). Finally, our work has also been guided by a perspective of intercultural replication: based on the fact that studies on allegiance have

already been conducted in Argentina, we chose Argentina as the first ground for applying our questionnaire.

In terms of assumptions, taking into account that Argentina is considered to be the most individualistic country of Latin America, with the highest hierarchical distance, and based on the fact that the studies conducted show a valuation of allegiance, we expect the following: 1) that the rule of equity and need supplant the rule of equality; 2) that allegiance holds, within this distribution based on equity, a share comparable to that of performance; 3) a more substantial salary distribution for allegiant employees (especially for the legalist allegiants or the allegiants out of conviction) than for rebel employees.

II. METHOD

This study, conducted in Argentina, involved 480 students (240 men and 240 women). They were contacted at their place of work in order to answer, voluntarily, to a questionnaire in which they were asked to advise the manager of a real estate agency regarding the distribution of a monthly bonus of 18.000 Argentinean pesos (the equivalent of 6000 euro) among his six employees, and, more precisely, to propose the amount they advise to be awarded to one of the six salesmen (Sebastian) based on three information characterizing Sebastian, information corresponding to three independent variables:

- 1) The fact that Sebastian is or is not in need (Sebastian has two children and his wife is unemployed / has no children and his wife has just found a very good situation);
- 2) His efficiency based on his performance (Sebastian is the 2nd or 5th best salesman, according to his performance);
- 3) His allegiant (that is to say, obedient) or rebel (disobedient) behaviour to a hierarchical discriminatory order (in this case, the manager asked his employees to avoid renting apartments to foreigners), with three possible types of allegiance (allegiance out of legalism, that is to say, that the person considers that an employee should systematically obey their boss; partisan allegiance, where the employee obeys out of conviction, he agrees with his boss; and allegiance out of opportunism, when an employee obeys out of a personal interest), and a case of rebellion (the person disobeys for moral or ethical reasons, that is to say, they refuse to discriminate): *acc. to the annex.*

The three independent variables have been crossed in order to produce a factorial plan of 16 cases, or, more precisely, the drafting of 16 questionnaires with which each of the 30 respondents (15 men and 15 women) were confronted.

Initially, we were interested in the number of egalitarian and non-egalitarian distributions when awarding bonuses to the six employees under the experimental conditions, and then we examined the amount of the bonus awarded to Sebastian. The treatment was an analysis of variance according to the plan: 2 (ranking: second vs. fifth) x 4 (allegiance: legalist vs. partisan vs. opportunist vs. rebellion) x 2 (need vs. non need).

III. RESULTS

A. Number of Egalitarian and Non-Egalitarian Distributions

The distribution of bonuses has first been examined in terms of its egalitarian *versus* non-egalitarian nature (Table I). Whether taken globally, or separately for men or women, and regardless of the situation examined, it seems that the distribution of the bonus is systematically more non-egalitarian than egalitarian (Table II). It should also be noted that neither one of the independent variable has affected the repartition. In other words, neither performance, nor allegiance, nor need, nor gender has influenced the proportions observed: effect of performance: $\chi^2_1=1,418$ $p=0.234$ (ns). Effect of allegiance: $\chi^2_3=5.473$ $p=0.14$ (ns). Effect of need: $\chi^2_1=0,574$ $p=0.449$ (ns). Effect of gender: $\chi^2_1=0.949$; $p=0.33$ (ns). However, when conducting a gender analysis, although we observe no effect on women (effect of performance on women: $\chi^2_1=0.89$ $p=0.766$ ns. Effect of allegiance on women: $\chi^2_3=1.244$ $p=0.742$ ns. Effect of need on women: $\chi^2_1=0.00$ $p=1$ ns), and the absence of the effect of need on men ($\chi^2_1=1.22$ $p=0.269$ ns), we notice an effect of performance and an effect of allegiance on men. The effect of performance ($\chi^2_1=4.208$ $p=0.040$) reflects the fact that when Sebastian is 2nd, the repartition is more non-egalitarian than when Sebastian is ranked 5th. As for the allegiance effect ($\chi^2_3=14.815$ $p=0.002$), it reflects the fact that the egalitarian/non-egalitarian difference is especially low for the opportunistic allegiance, then for legalist allegiance or rebellion, and then for partisan allegiance. The table of adjusted residuals (table 3) confirms this analysis. In fact, one will notice that the most discriminating methods are allegiance out of opportunism (which generates the most egalitarian distributions) and allegiance out of conviction (which leads to the most non-egalitarian distributions), the legalist allegiance not generating any difference.

TABLE I
 REPARTITION OF NUMBER OF EGALITARIAN AND NON-EGALITARIAN RESPONSES IN THE AWARDING OF THE BONUS ACCORDING TO THE EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS

	Stephan is in need				Stephan is not in need				Total	
	Stephan 2 nd		Stephan 5 th		Stephan 2 nd		Stephan 5 th		Equal	Uneq
	Equal	Uneq	Equal	Uneq	Equal	Uneq	Equal	Uneq		
Legalist Allegiant	8	22	7	23	5	25	6	24	26	94
Convinced Allegiant	4	26	5	25	4	26	8	22	21	99
Opportunistic Allegiant	5	25	12	18	9	21	10	20	36	84
Moral Rebel	6	24	5	25	9	21	8	22	28	92
Total	23	97	29	91	27	93	32	88	111	369

TABLE II
 EGALITARIAN/NON-EGALITARIAN REPARTITIONS

	% non-egalitarian	% egalitarian	P
Globally	76.9	23.1	0.00001
Men globally	78.8	21.3	0.00001
Men need +	81.7	18.3	0.00001
Men need -	75.8	24.2	0.00001
Men efficient +	84.2	15.8	0.00001
Men efficient -	73.3	26.7	0.00001
Men legalist	81.7	18.3	0.00001
Men convinced	88.3	11.7	0.00001
Men opportunistic	61.7	38.3	0.00001
Men rebel	83.3	16.7	0.00001
Women globally	75	25	0.00001
Women need +	75	25	0.00001
Women need -	75	25	0.00001
Women efficient +	74.2	25.8	0.00001
Women efficient -	75.8	24.2	0.00001
Women legalist	75	25	0.00001
Women convinced	76.7	23.3	0.00001
Women opportunistic	78.3	21.7	0.00001
Women rebel	70	30	0.00001

TABLE III

TABLE OF ADJUSTED RESIDUALS REGARDING THE EFFECT OF THE VARIABLE OBEDIENCE/DISOBEDIENCE ON THE EQUAL/UNEQUAL RATIO IN MEN

	Non-egalitarian repartitions	Egalitarian repartitions
Allegiance out of legalism	0,6	-0,6
Allegiance out of conviction	2,1	-2,1
Allegiance out of opportunism	-3,7	3,7
Moral rebellion	1,0	-1,0

B. Amount of the Bonus Awarded

A regression analysis shows first of all that, taken globally, our model with 4 variables explains 53% of the amount distributed. However, one notices that there are in fact 3 variables that play a role (gender does not interfere), with the following partial correlations: performance ($r=0.723$ $p\approx 0.00$), obedience ($r=0.117$ $p=0.025$), need ($r=0.175$ $p=0.01$). More precisely, the ANOVA conducted show that the amount distributed depends on performance, allegiance and need (acc. to Table IV): when Sebastian is efficient, or allegiant, or in need, he receives more than in the opposite case (gender does not interfere): performance ($F(1.367)=387$ $p\approx 0.00$ $n2=0.514$), allegiance ($F(3.365)=3.19$ $p=0.024$ $n2=0.026$), need ($F(1.367)=5.42$ $p=0.02$ $n2=0.015$), gender ($F(1.367)=1.37$ $p=0.242$ ns). Nevertheless, the analyses according to gender (Tables V and VI) lead to the mitigation of some of the results.

In fact, while the performance effect is observed both in men and women (the performance effect in men: $F(1.187)=241$ $p\approx 0.00$ $n2=0.564$, and in women: $F(1.178)=154$ $p\approx 0.00$ $n2=0.465$), the allegiance effect, observed on a global level (men and women regrouped) is not verified if we carry out a gender analysis, that is to say, on smaller numbers (the allegiance effect in men: $F(3.185)=2.02$ $p=0.113$ ns, and in women: $F(3.176)=1.34$ $p=0.263$ ns). Similarly, if we carefully observe the effect of the variable “need” on a global level, the gender analyses only indicate a tendency, in men, to distribute a more important bonus to Sébastien when he is in need compared to the case when he is free from need, and moreover there is a complete lack of effect in women (the need effect in men: $F(1.187)=3.51$ $p=0.063$, and in women: $F(1.178)=1.94$ $p=0.165$ ns).

TABLE IV

AVERAGE AMOUNTS FOR THE ENTIRE POPULATION, OF THE BONUSES AWARDED TO SEBASTIAN ACCORDING TO THE EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS

	Need			No need			Amount
	2 nd	5 th	Amount	2 nd	5 th	Amount	
Legalist allegiant	4452	2800	3608	4026	2045	3056	3320
Convinced allegiant	4666	2380	3546	4442	2222	3425	3487
Opportunistic allegiant	4399	2282	3513	3950	1824	2913	3220
Moral rebel	3981	1967	2953	3656	1962	2789	2877
Amount	4379	2353	3399	4041	2018	3058	

The higher the score, the more important the bonus awarded. The egalitarian cases were not taken into consideration in these statistics and calculations.

TABLE V
AVERAGE AMOUNTS, IN MEN, OF THE BONUSES AWARDED TO SEBASTIAN ACCORDING TO THE EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS

	Need			Without need			Amount
	2 nd	5 th	Amount	2 nd	5 th	Amount	
Legalist Allegiant	4448	2771	3646	4011	2171	3091	3351
Convinced Allegiant	4529	2548	3648	4506	2358	3515	3583
Opportunistic Allegiant	4689	2296	3807	3938	2005	2970	3401
Moral rebel	4130	1853	3031	3830	1671	2802	2935
Amount	4435	2342	3496	4102	2075	3121	

The higher the score, the more important the bonus awarded. The egalitarian cases were not taken into consideration in these statistics and calculations.

TABLE VI
AVERAGE AMOUNTS, IN WOMEN, OF THE BONUSES AWARDED TO SEBASTIAN ACCORDING TO THE EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS

	Need			Without need			Amount
	2 nd	5 th	Amount	2 nd	5 th	Amount	
Legalist Allegiant	4457	2829	3569	4042	1897	3016	3286
Convinced Allegiant	4853	2226	3430	4368	2059	3318	3377
Opportunistic Allegiant	4131	2273	3279	3959	1676	2867	3077
Moral rebel	3733	2111	2841	3464	2204	2777	2807
Amount	4308	2364	3293	3980	1962	2993	

The higher the score, the more important the bonus attributed. The egalitarian cases were not taken into consideration in these statistics and calculations.

Now, a more precise analysis of the effect of the "allegiance/rebellion" variable shows the absence of a significant difference between the 3 cases of allegiance: when Sébastien obeys out of legalism, out of conviction or out of opportunism, he receives the same amount: the legalism/conviction difference is not significant ($F(1.191)=0.68$ $p=0.41$ ns), just as the legalism/opportunism difference $F(1.176)=0.23$ $p=0.63$ ns), or the conviction/opportunism difference ($F(1.181)=1.58$ $p=0.21$ ns).

In fact, it appears that the differentiating criterion is in fact obedience *versus* disobedience. In fact, on a global level, the 3 cases of allegiance are significantly different from the case of

rebellion ($F(1.367)=7.86$ $p=0.005$ $n2=0.021$). More precise analyses also show that this difference is attributable to allegiance out of legalism and to allegiance out of conviction: legalism/rebellion ($F(1.184)=4.87$ $p=0.029$ $n2=0.026$), conviction/rebellion ($F(1.189)=8.98$ $p=0.003$ $n2=0.0454$). On the contrary, if Sebastian obeys out of opportunism, he is punished just the same as when he disobeys (opportunistic/rebellion: $F(1.174)=2.65$ $p=0.105$ ns).

Finally, we note that although there is no significant difference between men/women, it appears that, on a descriptive plan, men are systematically more generous than women (Table VII).

TABLE VII
EFFECT OF THE VARIABLES PERFORMANCE, OBEDIENCE AND NEED ACCORDING TO GENDER

	Averages Men	Averages Women	F	P	η_2
Sebastian is the 2 nd best seller	4280,356	4138,371	F (1,188) = 1,21	0,27	0,006
Sebastian is the 5 th best seller	2208,375	2169,637	F (1,177) = 0,06	0,81	0,00001
allegiance out of legalism	3351,408	3286,133	F (1,92) = 0,05	0,82	0,001
allegiance out of conviction	3582,585	3376,652	F (1,97) = 0,50	0,48	0,005
allegiance out of opportunism	3400,541	3077,489	F (1,82) = 1,07	0,31	0,013
Moral rebellion	2934,740	2807,333	F (1,90) = 0,20	0,66	0,002
Sebastian is not in need	3121,747	2993,167	F (1,179) = 0,39	0,53	0,002
Sebastian is in need	3495,653	3292,967	F (1,186) = 0,93	0,34	0,005

IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this study, we wanted to examine the preferential rule of distributive justice in terms of salary distribution: egalitarian or non-egalitarian rule, and in the case of a non-egalitarian rule, the importance of need and merit, the latter being operationalized by performance and allegiance to one's boss by taking into account the reasons for such allegiance/non allegiance.

Our results indicate first of all that of the three manners of repartition proposed by the theorists of distributive justice (equality, need, and equity), only the equality rule does not interfere: the repartitions of the bonus are systematically more

non-egalitarian than egalitarian. The results are compliant with our hypotheses. They are also compliant with the results obtained by [90]: the authors find that, in fact, in what regards professional relations, as is the case here, the preferential manner of resource repartition is non-egalitarian, the egalitarian choice being reserved for more emotional relational situations (for example family relations). Therefore, it appears that the three non-egalitarian criteria of repartition used in the case of our participants correspond to three repartition criteria that we have operationalized: the performance of the employee, their allegiance, and their state of need: when Sebastian is efficient, or allegiant, or in need, he receives more than in the opposite cases. More specifically, it appears that

the major factor for awarding the bonus is performance, effect observed both in men and women: overall, 51% of the variance is thus explained by performance.

The second determining factor for the reparation of the bonus is allegiance, but we note that this factor only interferes on a global level, and not in the case of a genre analysis (that is to say, on smaller numbers). Now, further analyses of the effect of this variable also show the absence of a significant difference between the 3 cases of allegiance: whether Sebastian obeys out of legalism, opportunism, or conviction, he receives the same amount. Based on previous works which have showed a differentiated valuation of allegiance according to its opportunistic or legalist basis [84], [91], we expected contrasting results, which is not the case here. On the contrary, the 3 cases of allegiance differentiate themselves significantly from the condition of rebellion: the bonus is smaller when Sebastian disobeys. This valuation of allegiance is in line with those usually obtained [77]. However, previous studies had not examined the case of moral rebel. This result is particularly interesting if we keep in mind that this disobedience is based indeed on moral foundations, and occurs out of ethical reasons consisting in the refusal to apply discriminating practices. Therefore, we observe here that an employee who accepts to practice discrimination is rewarded. For certain, this result contrasts to a certain extent those of [89]: the authors observe in fact a rejection of moral deviant. However, this rejection occurs only when the evaluators are formerly led by allegiant matters and fear that they will be misjudged by the deviants (otherwise, they value the deviant); on the other hand, the fact that their study was conducted on American students may perhaps also explain the difference as compared to the current results. That being said, it should also be noted that while on a global level the 3 cases of allegiance distinguish themselves significantly from the case of rebellion, further analyses show that this difference is due to allegiance out of legalism and to allegiance out of conviction; on the contrary, if Sebastian obeys out of opportunism, he is punished just as when he disobeys (the latter point joins the results of [84] or [91] on the relegation of the opportunistic allegiant, and on a more global level, on the differentiating effect of the various causes of allegiance).

Finally, note that the importance given to the fact of being or not in need is equally reported by the participants. However, in what regards the allegiance factor, this effect is only observed on the overall participants: the gender analyses indicate more of a tendency, in men, to distribute a more important bonus to Sébastien when he is in need as compared to the case when he is not in need, and the absence of any effect in women.

The main limitation of this work seems to therefore come from the relatively low number of our masculine and feminine populations, which leads, in the case of allegiance and need, to a failure of obtaining significant effects as when grouping men and women together. Moreover, we have not operationalized the cultural context. The replication of this work, in France, even in other cultural contexts, should now allow, when defining precisely those contexts, to examine their possible

impact. Finally, we also mention, in conclusion, that in spite of the absence of any significant men/women difference, it appears, on a descriptive plan, that men are systematically more generous than women. Again, an increase of participants could undoubtedly allow us to achieve significant differences. Then, obviously, it would only remain for us to interpret this phenomenon.

ANNEX: OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE ALLEGIANCE VARIABLE

Legalist Allegiance

Here is some information on the members of my team:

Overall, I am pleased with them: they are all serious and motivated in their work. *Especially Sebastian whom I've noticed that practically always respects my decisions.* For example, since I took the office, I've noticed that more and more owners refuse to rent their apartment to persons coming from certain Latin American countries, especially Bolivia. Since it's the owners that help us make a living, I've asked my salesmen to take it into account. *And Sebastian, he practically always takes it into account. It's a principle in his case: you shouldn't argue with your boss.*

Partisan Allegiance

Here is some information on the members of my team:

Overall, I am pleased with them: they are all serious and motivated in their work. *Especially Sebastian, whom I've noticed that practically always respects my decisions.* For example, after taking the office, I've noticed that more and more owners refuse to rent their apartment to persons coming from certain Latin American countries, especially Bolivia. Since it is the owners that help us make a living, I've asked my salesmen to take it into account. *And Sebastian, he practically always takes it into account. He also shares my opinion: it's the owners that help us make a living, and we have to respond to their demands.*

Opportunistic Allegiance

Here is some information on the members of my team:

Overall, I am pleased with them: they are all serious and motivated in their work. *Especially Sebastian, whom I've noticed that practically always respects my decisions.* For example, after taking the office, I've noticed that more and more owners refuse to rent their apartment to persons coming from certain Latin American countries, especially Bolivia. Since it's the owners that help us make a living, I've asked my salesmen to take it into account. *And Sebastian, he practically always takes it into account. His goal: to look good in my eyes in order to get a promotion quickly.*

Moral Rebellion

Here is some information on the members of my team:

Overall, I am pleased with them: they are all serious and motivated in their work. *However, I've noticed that Sebastian practically always challenges certain decisions I make.* For example, after taking the office, I've noticed that more and more owners refuse to rent their apartment to persons coming from certain Latin American countries, especially Bolivia.

Since it's the owners that help us make a living, I've asked my salesmen to take it into account. *But Sebastian, he practically never takes it into account. He believes that he doesn't have to obey me if my decisions go against his principles.*

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