The Problems of Employment Form Selection of Capital Group Management Team Members in the Light of Chosen Company Management Theories

Authors: D. Bąk-Grabowska, A. Jagoda

Abstract:

Managing a capital group is a complex and specific process. It creates special conditions for the introduction of team work organization of managers. The selection of a manager employment form is a problem which gets complicated in case of management teams. The considered possibilities are an employment-based and non-employment managerial contract, which can be based on a thorough action or on formulating definite expectations regarding the results of a manager’s work. The problem of selection between individual and collegiate settlement of managers’ work has been pointed out. The deliberations were based on the assumptions of chosen company management theories, including transactional cost, agency theory, nexus of contracts theory, stewardship theory and theories referring directly to management teams, i.e. Upper echelons theory. 

Keywords: Capital group, employment forms, management teams, managers.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1087956

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